Thus, in one recent transaction, lawyers have been criticized and may be sued because investors claim that certain transfers of assets accounted for as sales should have been accounted for as loans. 10 In another transaction, a court refused to dismiss a lawsuit against a law firm that had issued legal opinions on bankruptcy matters, even though the damage claimed in the lawsuit resulted from accounting failures.
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There probably would be many more examples of law firms being sued for accounting failures but for the fact that, at least until recently, lawyers-as secondary actors-could not be sued as aiders and abettors of securities fraud in private causes of action under the federal securities laws. 12 In the past several years, though, courts have adopted various theories to begin allowing private lawsuits against secondary actors, such as lawyers. Under a "bright-line" theory, a lawyer or other secondary actor who makes a material misrepresentation or omission now may be as liable as a primary violator of stating that lawyers can be considered gatekeepers in that they lend "their professional reputations to a transaction"). 9 See, e.g., Jonathan R. 164, 175 & 180 (1994) , the Supreme Court held that only primary actors could be held liable as aiders and abettors in a private cause of action under §10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. §78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder (17 CFR §240.10b-5). Therefore, only lawyers who act as primary violators, such as by employing a manipulative device or making a material misstatement or omission in connection with the sale of securities, would be subject to private lawsuits. 511 U.S. at 191. securities law. 13 Under a separate "substantial participation" theory, the lawyer need only have substantially participated or been intricately involved in the preparation of fraudulent financial statements, even if he did not actually make the statements. 14 And, under a third "creation" theory suggested to the court by the SEC, a lawyer who creates a misrepresentation, whether acting alone or with others and irrespective of whether such lawyer's identity is disclosed to investors, can be liable as a primary violator under federal securities law provided the lawyer acts with the requisite scienter. 15 These theories illustrate a liberal trend toward making lawyers liable for financial information failure, thereby setting the stage for a potential flood of private securities-fraud lawsuits. 16 The SEC itself also may start to more aggressively file civil charges against lawyers.
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This article examines, from a normative standpoint, the extent to which lawyers should be responsible for financial information failures. (discussing the emergence of lower courts theories as to when primary liability can be imposed on secondary actors after the Central Bank opinion). 14 Howard v. Everex System, Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n. 5 (9 th Cir. 2000). 15 In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, supra note 11 (denying a law firm's motion to dismiss complaint). 16 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004) (observing, id. at ___, a "judicial shift-whether conscious or unconscious-toward imposing greater liability on gatekeepers," including lawyers, in financial frauds; and showing, id. at ___, that empirical data indicate, in financial frauds, "the risk for gatekeepers [including lawyers] is real and growing"). 17 See Carrie Johnson, Lawyers in the Limelight, SEC Helps Police Their Misconduct, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2004 , at E01 (indicating that the SEC will more aggressively file civil charges against lawyers). Lawyers and other secondary actors who aid and abet securities fraud also could be held criminally liable. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (imposing criminal liability of principal actors on aiders and abettors). See also 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e)(2000); Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164 at 190. Although lawyers traditionally leave accounting to accountants, this overlap suggests the lawyer may have an affirmative duty to inquire into the accounting treatment.
The potential for overlap can best be illustrated through the duty of disclosing complex financial transactions. Consider first the standard duty of disclosure. Lawyers help their clients disclose material information to investors in the client's securities. 18 This disclosure often takes the form of narrative description in the prospectus or other offering documents used to sell the securities. 19 To the extent financial information is material, there is potential overlap in accountant and lawyer responsibility.
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Federal securities law makes accountants responsible for redacting financial information into formalized financial statements, such as balance sheets and income statements. Accountants are required to comply with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) when they prepare financial statements. GAAP is a set of standards for financial accounting and reporting promulgated by the accounting profession through its Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which delegates this power to FASB, officially recognizes GAAP as authoritative. 21 Compliance with GAAP is intended to ensure that financial statement 18 See SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240. 10B-5 (2000) . This article's analysis applies even where the lawyers helping in the disclosure are not the same as those engaging in the underlying transaction. See infra note 34 (discussing the distinction between these roles and its significance). 19 Although offering documents typically include the financial statements in addition to the narrative description, firms are independently required to issue their financial statements to the public. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b)(1) (2000) . Disclosure in the form of narrative description also may be provided in periodic reporting, such as the reporting required by § 13 of the Securities Exchange Act (which is provided in practice through SEC-required forms 10-K for annual, 10-Q for quarterly, and 8-K for defined-event reports). 20 Cf. infra note 167 (observing that this overlap to some extent may mitigate investor harm 24 See supra notes 21-19 and accompanying text (observing that accountants disclose by preparing a firm's financial statements in accordance with GAAP, whereas lawyers help their client-firms disclose by describing, in narrative form in offering documents and periodic reporting, information that may be material to investors).
making it difficult to assess the nature of the transaction, which has both legal and accounting consequences.
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For example, it is often difficult to assess whether complex financial transactions constitute sales of transferred assets or whether they are loans secured by those assets. 26 If the former, the transaction (barring other factors) would not be accounted for as a liability on the firm's balance sheet ("off-balance-sheet financing" 27 ). 28 Accounting for a transaction as a sale instead of a loan has a direct impact on the debtequity, or "leverage," ratio, which in its most common form is determined by total liabilities divided by total equity. Increasing debt raises that ratio, making the firm appear less stable. Sales, in contrast, do not increase leverage, and, indeed, firms can reduce leverage by using the proceeds of sales to repay existing debts. In contrast to such proactive lawyer-monitoring, 44 this article argues that a more passively responsive, or "reactive," lawyer-monitoring regime would be much less costly but almost equally effective, and that there are better solutions to the problem of financial information failure than lawyer monitoring, whatever its form.
ANALYSIS
Part I demonstrates that the costs of a proactive lawyer-monitoring regime would likely exceed its benefits. Part II then models a reactive lawyer-monitoring regime, again examining costs and benefits. Part III compares these regimes, showing that reactive lawyer-monitoring, while imperfect, appears preferable to a proactive regime. Finally, Part IV shows that lawyer monitoring, whatever its form, can only be a second-best solution to the problem of financial information failure. That Part also examines potential more optimal solutions.
"familiar pass-the-buck pas de deux in deal meetings and conference calls occurs when the accountant says, after an impasse, 'that's a legal problem' while the lawyer says 'that's an accounting problem.'" 44 Although there could be other approaches to proactive lawyer-monitoring, most would not represent advances over existing law. Professor Cohen, for example, suggests that to counter the rule-like nature of GAAP, a lawyer-monitoring regime could be "complementary" to the approach taken by accountants. E-mail from George Cohen, Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law, to the author (Aug. 29, 2005). Existing law, however, has long required accountants to deviate from GAAP rules as needed to fairly present financial information. See infra note 88 (discussing U.S. v. Simon). Another reviewer suggests a regime in which lawyers examine accountantgenerated financial statements and then determine whether additional narrative disclosure is required for fair presentation. 6 (1999) . In a typical securitization transaction, the firm originating the financial assets (sometimes referred to as the "originator") sells rights to payment from those assets to a wholly-owned SPE, which in turn transfers these rights to an independent SPE, which in turn issues securities to capital-market investors. The independent SPE uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay the first SPE for the financial assets, and the first SPE then uses those proceeds to pay the originator. The investors, who are repaid from collections of the financial assets, buy the securities based on their assessments of the value of the financial assets. Id. 1985) . As a young lawyer, I heard this explained through a joke. A pilot in a small plane loses visibility in dense fog, and-after long disorientation-is forced to make an emergency landing. Luckily, as the ground approaches he sees an empty highway, and manages to land safely. After a while a car pulls up, and the pilot asks where he is. The driver of the car, an accountant, responds that he is on a highway in the middle of a fog-information that is formally correct but not necessarily helpful to understanding the entire picture. I later discuss whether GAAP itself should be changed. (2003) (arguing that securities lawyers should function as "gatekeepers"-a role borne by "independent professionals who are so positioned that, if they withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation may be unable to effect some transaction or to maintain some desired status"-when they detect problems with a corporation's securities disclosure what has happened as having been inevitable but also to view it as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it happened.").
warning signs thus would continue the representation at their peril unless the warning signs (which may well be ambiguous) can be dispelled.
The obvious first step to resolve such a warning sign is to speak with the relevant accountants. If discussions are insufficient, counsel would have to attempt to balance additional investigatory costs with the willingness of the client to pay for those costs. I would envision a relatively summary investigation performed by the transactional lawyer, rather than a district-attorney-style fraud investigation performed by litigators. 107 If, notwithstanding these steps, the warning sign persists, or if other warning signs emerge, the lawyer should so inform the accountant and, in appropriate circumstances, withdraw from the representation. 108 Whether the lawyer should have some additional duty to inform government regulators or otherwise "noisily withdraw," and the extent to which such a duty would conflict with the duty to keep client confidences, are issues beyond this article's scope. 109 The viability of this regime turns on the ability of lawyers to identify warning signs, such as an accounting result that appears manifestly wrong. That in turn requires a rudimentary understanding of accounting principles. 110 In this regard, Professor
Cunningham has aptly observed that
[i]f business lawyers invariably confront questions of law and accounting in their practice, and it is difficult to understand core concepts and key cases in corporate law without a firm footing in accounting, it is incumbent upon the legal professorate to assure it provides adequate teaching.
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Other examples of warning signs might include the discovery of undisclosed sideagreements 112 or the failure to see a valid business purpose in a transaction. 113 The latter depends on what constitutes a business purpose. Raising financing or reducing its cost always should be a good business purpose. 114 So, too, should be shifting risk on assets to outside investors, or diversifying a firm's funding sources. 115 Mitigating taxes often has been viewed as a legitimate business practice. 116 At least until recently, it even could be 110 For a discussion of why this understanding of accounting need only be rudimentary, see infra notes 122-123 and related text. This rudimentary understanding contrasts with the much more sophisticated understanding of accounting that this article argues is appropriate for proactive lawyer-monitoring. Although one hypothetically could posit a proactive lawyer-monitoring regime also based on only a rudimentary understanding of accounting, such a regime would generate its own significant costs, requiring lawyers to actively second guess accounting determinations without a full understanding of what such determinations entail (and thereby increasing accountant and lawyer monitoring time and generating confusion). Cf. supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (observing that even lawyers well trained in accounting might confuse accountants, causing mistakes). 111 Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burdens, supra note 43, at 1449. 112 See, e.g., Powers Report, supra note 91, at 41-42, 49-50, 52 (observing that the financing structure Enron Corp. created for the Chewco SPE was at least 50% short of the required third-party equity need for accounting non-consolidation because a portion of such equity was protected by undisclosed reserve accounts funded by Enron) Costs: A reactive lawyer-monitoring regime should generate very low costs.
Lawyers would be required to investigate precisely when investigation is likely to produce benefits-when, and only when, the lawyers observe sufficient warning signs.
Monitoring time rarely should be billable because lawyers would need to be only passively alert to the presence of warning signs.
This regime also should not result in as high liability-insurance premium increases as a proactive regime. Furthermore, it should not aggravate legal uncertainty is impossible to distinguish sales from loans on economics alone, and reference to other distinguishing features is needed. See STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 62, § § 4:1-4:6 (discussing judicially-derived criteria for distinguishing sales from loans) & § 4:10 (normative discussion of criteria for distinguishing sales from loans This article therefore finally explores-albeit briefly because the boundary between lawyer and accountant responsibility is not involved-possible optimal solutions to the problem of financial information failure. Although not itself optimal, lawyer monitoring can supplement these other solutions. Where lawyer monitoring is employed, this article has shown that a reactive monitoring regime would be superior to one that is proactive. This article will not examine, however, whether lawyer monitoring should supplement other solutions; that is almost inevitable, given that lawyer monitoring is presently seen as a social good.
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Part IV: Seeking Optimal Solutions
Optimal solutions to the problem of financial information failure should directly address the primary actors giving rise to the failure-the firm, its accountants, and investors-or the underlying accounting system that permits the failure.
Regulating the firm: Any examination of optimal solutions for financial information failures must start with the firm, effectively meaning its management. Recall that financial information failures can be divided into three categories, the first of which is fraud. 142 Members of management are almost always the primary movers, if not the sole persons responsible, in this category, 143 so regulation to prevent fraud should focus primarily on management. Pursuant to powers delegated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 144 the SEC recently has taken this approach, promulgating rules and regulations aimed at reducing agency costs.
To some extent, the increasing complexity of financial transactions has made it easier for management to disguise fraud, 146 a problem that may require its own solutions.
One possible solution is to limit complex financial transactions, although this would be inefficient. 147 Another solution, though itself second-best, 148 is to prohibit the conflicts of interest that (as in Enron) increase the likelihood that management may be engaging in overly complex transactions for ulterior motives.
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Regulating the firm's accountants: Accountants are primarily responsible for the secondary category of financial information failures-those caused by mistake or misinterpretation of GAAP. 150 In this regard, accountants play two separate roles: helping to structure transactions to achieve accounting goals under GAAP, and auditing transactions to confirm GAAP compliance. 148 Id. at 37 & 37 n. 227 (suggesting that there may be no first-best solution to the problem of financial complexity). 149 Id. at 31-36. The theory of this approach is that complexity undermines the disclosure paradigm in which sophisticated investors and securities analysts bring market prices into line with disclosure. Therefore continued reliance on disclosure would be justified only absent cost-effective supplemental protections. Although these protections might include governmental or private-sector certifications of securities quality or even direct or indirect guaranties of securities value, prohibiting these management conflicts of interest would be more optimal because, in the face of complexity, investors must rely not only on disclosure but also on the business judgment of management in setting up complex transactions for the company's benefit. To that end, the law similarly should focus, in addition to disclosure, on requiring management to be free of conflicts of interest that would affect management's judgment in those transactions. Id. at 36-37. 150 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 151 [cite]
(IAS). The costs and benefits of such a transformation are currently being hotly debated. 160 Educating a firm's investors: Notwithstanding these solutions, some financial information failures inevitably will occur because investors are human. Government can mitigate the likelihood and impact of these failures, however, by educating investors to take into account all relevant sources of financial information. Ironically, the most important source for this information is the footnotes to financial statements. GAAP requires firms and their accountants to disclose there most material financial information not already embodied in the financial statements themselves. 161 The ultimate financial information failure is that of investors to read, much less study, these footnotes. 162 The footnotes to Enron's financial statements, for example, revealed many (if not all) of the troublesome potential liabilities that ultimately caused Enron to collapse. 163 Simply educating investors to read these footnotes carefully can contribute significantly to solving the problem of financial information failure. 164 The good news is No lawyer monitoring regime, however, can fully solve the problem of financial information failure. 167 More effective solutions would need to directly address the 166 Because this article addresses financial information failure (e.g., misleading financial statements), the expertise primarily at issue is accounting, as to which accountants are experts and lawyers are non-experts. 
